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When career civil servants discuss the pay differential between govern- 
ment and private employment, they frequently remind each other to allow 
for the effects of their rather generous pension program. What has been a 
commonplace for federal employees-that  the nation has incurred sub- 
stantial future obligations to them-has  not, however, attracted much at- 
tention from the public at large or even from commentators on govern- 
ment spending until very recently. When “federal borrowing” is discussed, 
the term almost never includes the borrowing implicit in making promises 
to pay future pensions. Even when “off-budget” spending is discussed, 
the failure to note promises of future pension payments in current budget 
documents is rarely mentioned. And when commentators try to recon- 
struct the actual deficit of the federal government, correcting for the ab- 
sence of a capital budget and for credit and off-budget programs, accrual 
of liabilities for federal pensions is virtually never proposed. 
The commitments embodied in the Federal Civil Service Retirement 
System exceed the currently and prospectively available assets out of 
which they are supposed to be paid by over one-half trillion dollars. Com- 
parable estimates for the net liabilities of the military pension systems are 
of the same order of magnitude, and those for the social security system 
indicate net liabilities of over a trillion dollars. Thus, the three major “re- 
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tirement” programs of the federal government have net liabilities of ap- 
proximately twice the currently officially recognized national debt. If the 
annual “deficit” and the size of the “national debt” are major political is- 
sues, the “quasidebt” constituted by the net liabilities of federal retire- 
ment systems should be an issue as well. Yet, because they are shrouded in 
the mystical cloak of “actuarial estimates” and are not treated in the stan- 
dard budget documents considered by the Congress, they generally have 
received little attention. Recently the social security system has come un- 
der closer scrutiny, largely because it threatened to run out of cash. Until 
the latest round of considerable attention and public study, only a few of the 
most educated commentators were aware of  its long-term actuarial posi- 
tion. The Civil Service Pension System and its military counterpart are 
hardly noticed at all. 
An interesting example of the lack of  enthusiasm for these issues may 
be found in a recent compendium of papers from the American Economic 
Association annual meetings. The Proceedings volume of the American 
Economic Review in May of 1982 devoted considerable space to  a variety 
of papers discussing various aspects of the economics of government. A 
wide range of on- and off-budget programs were treated. Federal wages, 
tax expenditures, credit programs, and entitlement programs were scruti- 
nized in detail. There is almost no mention of the Civil Service Retirement 
System. 
This paper considers the fiscal condition of the federal Civil Service Re- 
tirement System and analyzes a major proposed reform of that system 
embodied in the budget requests currently before the Congress. The cen- 





The “unfunded liability” of the current system is approximately 
$540 billion in 1982  dollars. 
Labor expenses recognized in the direct expenditures budget con- 
sidered by Congress should be about 22% higher than they currently 
are to account for full funding of pension obligations accrued in 
each year. In 1982, this would increase federal labor expenses by 
about $14 billion. 
The existing system provides a strong financial incentive for federal 
employees to continue working up until they attain full retirement 
eligibility-usually  between ages 55 to 60.  It then provides a strong 
incentive for them to  retire. 
The reform proposal advanced by the Office of Personnel Manage- 
ment  (OPM) would  constitute  a  major overhaul of  retirement 
benefits. It would close the current funding gap solely by cutting 
benefits received by and net wages paid to current federal employ- 
ees. It would constitute a 50% cut in the net pension wealth of cur- 
rent employees. It is comparable financially to a 15%-30%  cut in 
the annual compensation of federal employees over the remainder 
of their working lives. 401  The Federal Civil Service Retirement System 
5. The OPM reform proposal would reduce the cash outlays of the re- 
tirement system funded by taxpayers by about $4 billion per year 
for the remaining years of this decade and by larger amounts in later 
years. It would cut the unfunded liability of the system by one- 
quarter, to $400 billion. It would reduce the full funding rate from 
36% to 20%. 
6.  The OPM reform proposal would substantially alter the retirement 
incentives of the current system, completely eliminating the exist- 
ing incentive to retire as soon as full eligibility is  attained.  This 
could have a considerable impact on the age and experience compo- 
sition of the federal work force. 
14.1  The Existing System 
The Office of Personnel Management annually presents a number of 
reports on the status, changes, and prospects of the Civil Service Retire- 
ment System. These views are not entirely consistent with one another. 
The differences among them reflect differences in statutory requirements 
for how the system is to be viewed and funded. None gives an adequate 
picture of the condition of the fund. 
14.1.1 
The only widely agreed-on characteristics of the fund are those having 
to do with the objective facts of  its operation and status-anything  in- 
volving projections of  its future operations is almost by definition a mat- 
ter of controversy. The system is a defined benefit pension plan providing 
retirement and disability insurance benefits for a covered enrollment of 
approximately 2.7 million employees, 1.3 million retired employees, and 
430 thousand survivors of  employees or annuitants.  The plan has pro- 
vided benefits that are generous compared to most private pensions. Em- 
ployees can currently retire with full benefits at age 55 with 30 years of ser- 
vice, at age 60 with 20 years of service, and at age 62 with five years of 
service. The current annuity formula provides benefits of 1 112 Yo  of aver- 
age salary per year of  service for the first five years of  service; 1 314% of 
average salary per year of service for the next five years of service; and 2% 
of average salary per year of service for any remaining years of service, 
with a maximum of  80% of average salary. Full disability benefits are 
available to any employee with five years of service. Disability benefits are 
40% of  salary or the retirement  formula projecting  service to age 60, 
whichever is higher. 
A critical feature of the current system is that benefit payments are in- 
dexed to the cost of living after retirement. Moreover, the “average salary” 
used in the benefit formula refers to the three highest years of earnings 
(generally the last three years of employment). Thus, the level of  benefits 
with which the retiree starts is also indexed to inflation, provided that fed- 
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era1 salaries are increased to keep pace with the cost of living. Both of 
these features have very large impacts on the financial status of the pen- 
sion system, and both are the subjects of considerable controversy. In- 
deed, the appropriate treatment of these two features of the system is per- 
haps the most important choice involved in the actuarial estimation of the 
financial condition of the system. 
The benefits of the retirement system have been increased and the cov- 
erage extended to additional employees in a number of major revisions of 
the system since its inception in 1920. Thus, the system has accrued sub- 
stantial unfunded prior service costs over the years. The last major alter- 
ation in the system was in 1969, when the basis for the average salary cal- 
culation was reduced from the highest five years of earnings to the highest 
three. 
In theory, the system is funded out of contributions of  14% of pay- 
roll-7%  each from employees and their agencies. In fact these payments 
are not adequate to cover the current cash obligations of the system, and 
the federal treasury annually makes an additional contribution to the 
fund. This contribution is computed on the basis of an analysis of the 
“unfunded liability” of the system and is supposed to constitute a pay- 
ment in lieu of the interest that would have been earned on assets in the 
fund if it were fully funded. The actuarial estimation of the obligations of 
the fund, and thus its unfunded liability, is therefore an issue of current 
operating interest both to the fund and to the Congress. Indeed, the Con- 
gress’s direct interest in the matter led it to specify its intentions concern- 
ing how the fund’s obligations were to be valued. 
In part because the issue is of such material importance to the fund and 
in part because the Congress specified its preferred form of valuation, a 
variety of different accountings of the fund are rendered each year. Under 
any estimation procedure, the present value of the obligations of the sys- 
tem substantially exceed the present value of its prospective income plus 
its current assets. All valuations thus agree that the system has a large “un- 
funded liability.” But different valuation methods lead to quite disparate 
estimates of what this liability is, and hence to controversy about the ap- 
propriate  methods of  valuation.  (Appendix 14.A discusses alternative 
methods of  valuation of pension obligations and evaluation of pension 
fund performance.) 
14.1.2  “Economic” Assumptions and Fund Valuation 
In the actuarial valuation of any retirement system, a series of interrelated 
assumptions about future economic conditions are crucial. Among these 
are assumptions about the future values of interest rates, rates of salary 
increase, increases in retirement benefits, and so on. In addition, the esti- 
mates rely upon the future stability of existing patterns of career promo- 
tions, promotion-related salary increases, and retirement decisions. 403  The Federal Civil Service Retirement System 
There is,  however,  one  aspect  of  future economic  conditions that 
should not make much difference in valuing the pension system. If infla- 
tion in general prices is treated consistently in the actuarial valuation, its 
assumed rate will be of little consequence. This is because any consistent 
valuation method will present the estimated values in real terms-that  is, 
in terms relative to the rate of general price increases. So long as values are 
consistently expressed in real terms and the assumed rates of increase (or 
decrease) of specific values-like  salaries or benefits after retirement-are 
expressed as real rates, the rate of inflation by itself is an unimportant 
assumption. ' 
What is crucial, then, is the assumed real rate of  return on fund assets 
and the real rate of increase (or decrease) in salaries and benefits after re- 
tirement.  There has been little controversy concerning the appropriate 
real rate of return to assume for fund assets. In contrast to a rather odd 
valuation in the 1980 annual report in which the Board of  Actuaries for 
the fund assumed a 5% real rate of return on assets for the indefinite fu- 
ture, recent official reports of the fund's condition have presumed modest 
real rates of return in the range of 0.5%-2070.  (In some cases real rates as 
high as 3%-5%  have been assumed for the next one or two years.) Given 
the historical performance of the fund-invested  by law in fixed interest 
special securities of the United States Treasury-it  may be optimistic to 
presume that the real rate of return on fund assets will exceed zero-that 
is, that the fund will do any better than just keep even with inflation. If, 
however, the fund were somewhat more aggressively managed-not  an  in- 
conceivable outcome of current criticism of its operations-it  might well 
be able to achieve a modest positive real return. 
The rate of return on fund assets is a crucial parameter because it pro- 
vides the rate-of-time discount that allows us to compare the values of ob- 
ligations in future periods with currently and prospectively available fund 
assets. It is, therefore, most appropriately interpreted as the rate at which 
we  should discount the pension obligations of  the government. Since we 
are trying to discern the value of these obligations on the theory that they 
constitute real governmental debts, there are powerful arguments for us- 
ing the real risk-free rate of return in the economy-perhaps  1%-2%-as 
the appropriate discount rate. This choice is independent of the actual fi- 
nancial performance of the fund, as it should be since any eventual deficit 
in the fund will have to be paid by the Treasury. In the work presented 
here, all obligations have been discounted at an assumed risk-free rate of 
1.5% in real terms.* 
Different official reports of  the fund are of different minds about how 
to treat future inflation. Table 14.1 shows three official estimates of the 
unfunded liability of the system. The first estimate is from Fringe Benefit 
Facts 1980, a publication  of the Office of  Personnel Management that 
provides an official overview of the fringe benefits received by federal em- 404  Herman B. Leonard 
Table 14.1  Official Estimates of the Unfunded Liabilities of the Civil Service 
Retirement System, September 1980 (1980 Dollars) 
Total Unfunded  Unfunded Liability 
Liability ($)  per Employee ($) 
No future increases in 
salaries or benefits 
Future increases in 
benefits but not in 
salaries 
166.4 billion  62,000 
357.3  billion  132,000 
Future increases in both  469.5  billion  174,000 
salaries and benefits 
Sources:  Line  1:  Office of  Personnel Management, Fringe Benefit (1981a) p.  11.  U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
Line 2:  Office of Personnel Management (1982),  table 1.  Assumes no  future gen- 
eral schedule increases in salaries; benefits after retirement are assumed 
to be constant in real terms. 
Line 3:  OPM (1982),  table 4.  Assumes salaries grow in real terms at %To  per 
year; benefits after retirement are assumed to be constant in real terms. 
ployees and presents financial information associated with each plan. It 
assumes that there will be no future increases in either salaries or benefits 
other than those currently mandated.  For purposes  of  this  valuation, 
OPM interprets this to mean that there would be no future increases, even 
though benefits after retirement are indexed by law to the cost of living. 
Even with these highly restrictive assumptions, the unfunded liability of the 
system is over $160 billion, about $62 thousand for each current employee. 
The “normal cost” of the system under these assumptions is worth not- 
ing. Normal cost is the percentage of an average employee’s salary that 
must be put aside in each year of service in order to fund the pension over 
the employee’s career. According to the fund’s actuaries, if there is no fu- 
ture inflation in salaries or benefits, combined annual contributions from 
the employee and employer of about 14% of salary would be adequate to 
prevent deterioration in the financial integrity of the system. The current 
funding rate is consistent with the continued financial health of the system 
only in the absence of  future inflation. 
In its 1982 annual report, the Board of Actuaries of the fund presented 
an alternative set of estimates of the financial status of the system based 
on the assumption that retirement benefits would continue to be indexed 
to the cost of  living and that inflation would continue at the (Office of 
Management and Budget estimated) rate of 5% per annum. They chose, 
however, to treat future increases in salaries as a matter of choice for the 
Congress, and therefore did not project any “general schedule” increases 
in future salaries. The result is shown in line 2 of table 14.1; the unfunded 
liabilities of the system are approximately $360 billion, about $130 thou- 405  The Federal Civil Service Retirement System 
sand  per  current  federal  employee.  At  current  average  wages,  this 
amounts to nearly six years of salary for each employee. 
This is still not an accurate measure of the condition of  the fund, be- 
cause it ignores the effects of future salary increases. Such increases will 
have two effects. First, they will provide a larger source of incoming con- 
tributions.  Second, and more powerfully, they will  raise the retirement 
benefits of future retirees. The Board of Actuaries recognizes that ignor- 
ing these effects constitutes a potentially serious misrepresentation of the 
condition of the fund. Accordingly, they present an additional alternative 
set of calculations of the obligations of the fund based on the assumption 
that both benefits and salaries are likely to keep pace with future infla- 
tion. Specifically,  the board assumed that salaries will rise in real terms by 
0.5% per year and that benefits after retirement will stay constant in real 
terms. The results are shown in line 3 of table 14.1, taken from the 1982 
annual report of the retirement system. 
The substantive difference between the results in lines 2 and 3 of table 
14.1 is in the estimated cost of future payments to those who have not yet 
retired.  If salaries continue to keep pace with inflation (as is assumed in 
the calculations for line 3), benefit levels for employees who have not yet 
retired will be considerably higher. The projections for those who have re- 
tired already are unaffected, since in both valuations their benefits were 
presumed to be constant in real terms. The change is substantial; the un- 
funded liability rises by over $100 billion, to $469 billion, about 7.5 years 
of salary for the average federal employee. 
Under these assumptions, the current funding structure of  the retire- 
ment  system is  far from adequate.  The normal cost computed by  the 
Board of Actuaries  allowing for inflation in both salaries and benefits 
after retirement amounts to 36% of payroll. Since the employees’ contri- 
bution is 7% this would leave 29% to be paid by the government-four 
times current agency contributions.  Recognizing the inadequacy of the 
current funding structure, Congress has moved to address the issue of the 
unfunded liability, albeit through rather an indirect method. As we shall 
see, even the device chosen by Congress will not long provide adequate 
coverage. 
14.1.3 
The inadequacy of the funding of the retirement system has been a mat- 
ter of more than academic interest for several years. The Congress moved 
during the 1970s to address the problem as a consequence of projections 
indicating that the fund would not only have a substantial and increasing 
unfunded liability but would also quickly run out of cash. The operating 
revenues of the system-the  direct employer and employee contributions 
from payroll-were  substantially less than fund disbursements in  1980. 
Table 14.2 shows the 1980 operating flows, the effect on available funds in 
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Table 14.2  Operating Flows of  the Civil Service Retirement System, 1980 (in 
Billions of  Dollars) 
Assets available at year start 
Investment income 
Net capital gains  (  .3) 
Interest  5.1 
Employer  3.6 
Employee  3.7 
Contributions 
Total Additions 
Benefits paid  14.9 
Administrative expense  .I 
Total deductions 
Net flow from operations 
Prospective assets at year end 
Supplemental Treasury payment 





61  .O 
11.9 
73 .O 
Source: Office of  Personnel Management (1982). Computed from figures in table 2. 
the absence of congressional action, and the supplemental payment ap- 
propriated by Congress to maintain the cash basis integrity of the system. 
If  Congress had not supplemented the funding of the retirement sys- 
tem, the fund would have decreased by  nearly $3 billion in 1980. This 
would have eroded the fund’s earning potential and would have started a 
downward spiral leading quickly to bankruptcy. This prospect motivated 
the Congress to provide  additional funding for the system during the 
1970s. The action Congress took does not, however, guarantee the integrity 
of the fund. Congress chose a modestly rational and relatively inexpensive 
expedient that ensures only that the cash position of the fund will not dete- 
riorate precipitously in the near future. 
A standard solution to the problem that the retirement system faced- 
indeed, the solution that the Congress legislated for private pension funds 
in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974-consists  of two 
parts: (1) Raise the contribution rate to the fund to the “full funding” level. 
Based on the “entry age normal” cost concept, this would mean raising 
the level of contributions from the current 14% rate to  about 36% of pay- 
roll;3 and (2) adopt a funding schedule to pay off  the principal and accu- 
mulating interest of the “unfunded liability” of the system. In its 1980 an- 
nual report, the appointed Board of Actuaries of the system argued at 
length for these reforms. Congress had already chosen, however, to  adopt 
a variant of the “interest” portion of part 2 of this program and not to 
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liability, leaving the principal unamortized. The reason its method is a 
variant of this portion is that it chose to define the interest and the un- 
funded liability without reference to current or future inflation. The re- 
sulting construct is a strange animal indeed. 
Why would the Congress choose not to amortize the principal of the in- 
debtedness? Obviously, it is less expensive-currently-to  ignore it. One 
rationale for ignoring it is that the current unfunded liability represents 
underfunded past service costs incurred on behalf of past taxpayers for 
services they received. These costs should have been borne at the time the 
services were rendered to the taxpayers who received them, but they were 
not. There is no obvious reason why current and future taxpayers should 
make back payments against this debt. According to this argument, there 
is no reason to retire the accumulated unfunded debt as long as the fund 
remains solvent on a cash basis. 
This would make a good deal more sense if  it were combined with a 
commitment to end the practice of underfunding from now on. The Con- 
gress chose, however, to continue adding to the unfunded liability in addi- 
tion to ignoring its current size. It did, however, realize that the fund was 
losing interest because it was not fully funded. The interest income from 
the investments the system would make if it were fully funded would be an 
important source of additional cash for current payments. The Congress 
decided to “simulate” full funding:  an annual payment is made to the 
fund representing the additional interest payments it would have received 
if it had been fully funded. 
This left the problem of determining the rate of interest to be paid and 
the amount of the hypothetical funding on which to pay it. The rate was 
relatively simple: the interest is paid at the rate of other special issues of 
the Treasury, approximately-but  typically a little below-the  current 
long-term Treasury bond rate. As we have seen, however, the amount of 
the unfunded liability is a matter of  some controversy. The legislation 
passed by the Congress establishing the “in lieu of interest’’ payments has 
been interpreted to mean that the unfunded liability of the system is to be 
evaluated under the assumption that there will be no inflation either in sal- 
aries or in benefits after retirement.  This leads to a valuation like that 
shown in line 1 of table 14.1, which, as indicated above, gives far too fa- 
vorable a view of the financial condition of the system. 
There are three major conceptual flaws in the solution adopted by the 
Congress. First, the financial integrity of the system cannot be insured by 
any means that does not eventually bring the current funding into line 
with the current accrual of  liabilities. Second, while payment of interest 
on the “unfunded liability” will keep the debt from growing any larger (if 
the current practice of  underfunding is discontinued), it will not do so if 
the principal amount on which this interest is figured is grossly underesti- 
mated. Finally, if the purpose is to keep the unfunded liability from grow- 408  Herman B. Leonard 
ing, this should probably be interpreted in real rather than nominal terms. 
Thus, the in lieu interest payment that the Congress should make should 
be figured on  the basis of the real liability and should be figured at the real 
interest rate. By contrast, the Congress has chosen to  pay interest on what 
might be termed the “nominal” liability-which  ignores inflation and is 
far too small-and  at the “nominal” interest rate, which includes a charge 
for the inflation erosion of principal. 
As it turns out, the current high nominal interest rates, in conjunction 
with a substantially underestimated “debt” on which to pay them, led the 
Congress to pay, by accident and not by design, approximately the “right” 
amount of interest last year-about  $10 billion-and  perhaps even a bit 
more than would be required to pay the real interest rate on a more accu- 
rately estimated liability. The current economic setting might, therefore, 
provide a natural time to switch from the rather awkward method that has 
been employed to  date toward one that has a better conceptual and practi- 
cal basis. 
14.1.4  The Financial Condition of the Civil Service Retirement System: 
The Baseline Simulation for 1981 
To provide a baseline for comparison of the major reform proposal for 
the retirement system, an analysis of  the Civil Service Retirement System 
for 1981 was prepared using a computer simulation model that represented 
1700 age-experience categories of employees for each sex. Simulations 
were run for 120 years. All computations were carried out in real terms, 
and all economic assumptions were specified in terms of real rates. The 
rates of promotional salary increases; voluntary, involuntary, and disabil- 
ity retirement; and separation of employment due to  withdrawal or death 
were projected from recent experience of  the system, published in its an- 
nual reports. 
Critical Economic Assumptions 
The baseline simulation assumes that the fund will earn a risk-free real 
return of  1.5%  on its assets. As indicated earlier, the fund could conceiv- 
ably be managed so as to  earn a higher expected rate of interest, but prob- 
ably only by investment in higher-risk assets. On a risk-adjusted basis, this 
rate would appear to be reasonable. It simply assumes that there are no 
“bargains”-securities  with higher than average risk-adjusted returns- 
available in the capital markets. A lower rate would be defensible, but in 
the spirit of erring on the side of conservatism in estimating the unfunded 
liability, this rate was chosen for the base case.4 
General schedule increases in federal salaries are assumed to proceed at 
the rate of  1%  annually in real terms. This presumption is based on the 
notion that long-term real national economic growth will be sustained in 
excess of 1070 per annum, and the real wages of federal employees will not 
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Under existing law, benefits paid to retired employees are indexed to the 
cost of living. In the past, the form of indexing guaranteed growth of 
these benefits in real terms.  Recently, however,  the indexing has been 
modified so that increases are granted only once each year and are related 
to the increase in the consumer price index over the preceding 12 months. 
Accordingly, the baseline simulation assumes that benefits after retire- 
ment will be constant in real terms. 
Estimates of real values for the current retirement system are nearly 
neutral with respect to the assumed rate of inflation. The only aspect of 
the system that is defined in nominal terms is the computation of  “aver- 
age” salary, which is used to  establish the annuity payment in the first year 
of retirement. This average, which is taken over the highest three years of 
salary, is lower relative to salary in the final year if inflation is high than if 
it is low. Even this effect, however, is relatively minor. The baseline simu- 
lation assumes continuing annual inflation at the rate of 5%. 
Table 14.3 summarizes the fundamental assumptions of  the baseline 
simulation. 
Baseline Simulation Results 
A summary of the results of the baseline simulation is shown in table 
14.4. The unfunded liability of  the retirement system as of October 1981 
was about $540 billion. This net liability results from a current present 
value of projected benefit payments of $894 billion, with projected future 
collections (at a full funding rate) of $281 billion and current assets of $73 
billion. The estimated present value of future benefit payments to em- 
ployees now working or on the annuity rolls exceeds the present value of 
projected total future salary payments to current employees. Even if  we 
used all of the current funds and contributed an amount equal to all future 
salary payments to existing employees, we  would be unable to pay the 
benefits to these employees and those currently on the rolls. Cash solvency 
will  only be  maintained  through  supplemental appropriations  and the 
contributions made by and on behalf of employees not yet employed. 
The actuarial unfunded liability effectively assumes that future funding 
of the system will be at the full normal cost rate. As table 14.4 indicates, 
Table 14.3  Baseline Simulation Assumptions 
Annual Rate (070) 
Real rate of  return on fund assets 
Real rate of salary growth 
Real rate of benefits growth 
(after retirement) 





Note: Retirement, disability, death, separation rates as reported in Office of Personnel Man- 
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Table 14.4  Baseline Simulation Results for the Civil Service Retirement System, 
October 1981 
Present value of projected benefit payments: 
Current annuitants  $269 billion 
Future annuitants  $625 billion 
Total  $894 billion 
Present value of projected future salaries: 
Current employees  $776 billion 
Present value of  future contributions: 
Employees  $  54 billion 
Employer (current funding rate)  $  54 billion 
Total contributions  ($108 billion) 
Current assets  ($  73 billion) 
Excess of  liabilities over assets 
(current funding rate) 
Additional employer contributions 
(full funding rate) 
$7 13 billion 
($172 billion) 
Actuarial unfunded liability  $540 billion 
Normal cost as percentage of salaries 
Unfunded liability per employee 
36.2 
$200,000 
Source: Simulation. See table 14.3 and text for assumptions. 
this amounts to an additional contribution over the remaining working 
lives of current employees of about $172 billion (in present value) more 
than is currently contemplated under existing official employer contribu- 
tions. Thus, an alternative way to read the results of the baseline simula- 
tion is to observe that if we make additional contributions over and above 
the official 7% of salaries in amounts equal to a present value of $172 bil- 
lion, then we will only be behind in funding the retirement of current em- 
ployees by $540 billion (in present value) when they retire. If we continue 
current underfunding, our net liability to these workers will be over $700 
billion. 
The full finding rate associated with the current employee, benefit, and 
economic structure of  the retirement  system is  about 36%  of  payroll, 
roughly the same as that projected by the board of Actuaries on the basis 
of similar assumptions for the preceding year. Since the contribution rate 
(exempting the supplemental payment from the Treasury) is only 14% the 
annual underfunding of the current obligations of the system is approxi- 
mately 22% of payroll, or about $14 billion this year. In addition to this 411  The Federal Civil Service Retirement System 
underfunding, the fund is depleted by virtue of not receiving interest in- 
come on the investments it would have made with the extra funds it would 
have if it were fully funded. In 1981, with an unfunded liability of $540 
billion and a presumed real rate of return of 1 1/2% this was an additional 
$8 billion loss. 
The condition of  the retirement  system would have deteriorated  by 
about $22 billion in real terms last year if the Treasury had made no sup- 
plemental contribution to it. As it was, with a supplemental contribution 
of about $14 billion, the financial condition of the fund deteriorated by 
about $8 billion. Thus, presuming 5% inflation, the current unfunded li- 
ability can be expected to be about $575 billion in 1982 dollars. 
Under the baseline assumptions, the projected cash position of the re- 
tirement system is not critical for the moment, due to the projected con- 
tinuing supplemental appropriations from the Treasury. In the early years 
of  the next century, however, the situation can be expected to deteriorate. 
Following a decade of  relative stability in the level of  fund assets, funds 
will begin to flow out at the Cate of about $3 billion per year. This trend 
will be exacerbated by the reduction in interest income received as the in- 
vested funds decrease and will not be offset under current projections of 
the Treasury’s supplemental payment.  The baseline simulation projects 
approximately $40 billion in available funds in the year 2000-roughly 
half today’s assets-and  a zero cash balance in 2008, 
The financial condition of the current retirement system is precarious. 
The system has an enormous net liability-roughly  half the size of the cur- 
rently recognized national debt. In nominal terms, the unfunded liability 
of the civil service retirement system appears to be growing at roughly the 
same rate as the national debt, and so is staying about half as large. The 
nominal change in the national debt from year to year is referred to as the 
“budget deficit,” and it attracts widespread attention in the Congress and 
in the media. The corresponding nominal “deficit” of the federal pension 
system this year is approximately $35  billion. 
As with the explicit national debt, great care must be exercised in inter- 
preting the quasi debt represented by the nation’s civil service pension ob- 
ligations. First, just as some of the costs are  passed along to future taxpay- 
ers,  some  of  the  benefits  may  be  also.  If,  for  example,  the  pension 
obligations were incurred as federal workers built physical assets to be 
used in the future, some of the benefits will be received by future taxpay- 
ers. Second, while their liability is a real one, taxpayers presumably ob- 
tained some benefits in the form of reduced wages paid to federal workers 
as a consequence of the pension “compensation” those workers received. 
Indeed, there is evidence that, excluding pension compensation, federal 
employees receive lower pay than comparable workers in the private sec- 
tor. If part of the (political) purpose of having a federal pension system is 
to move some of  federal workers’ compensation off budget, the political 412  Herman B. Leonard 
goal of reducing the apparent cost of government services to taxpayers is 
only met if  the on-budget portion of compensation (wages) is in fact re- 
duced. We would thus expect that pension obligations were incurred in ex- 
change for some reduction in wages. However, this exchange is likely to be 
inefficient, because both workers and taxpayers appear to view $1 of pres- 
ent value of pension benefits as less valuable than $1 of current wages. If, 
for example, workers value $1 of pension benefits at 50 cents, then total 
compensation  must  be  increased as  wage  reductions  are achieved by 
granting pension benefits. 
Moreover, many would argue that public debts should be a source of 
alarm only when they grow as a fraction of gross national product-that 
is, when the burden of taxes they represent grows as a fraction of taxpay- 
ers’ incomes. Even on this standard, however, the nation’s civil service 
pension obligations are growing, albeit rather slowly. Unlike the explicit 
national debt, which consists of nominal governmental obligations whose 
real burden is eroded by inflation, federal pensions are fully indexed, so 
that inflation does not materially alter the real size of the taxpayers’ debt. 
In addition, continuing underfunding adds to the real unfunded liability 
each year. In 1982, a contribution of about $19 billion more than the offi- 
cial employee and employer funding would have been required to keep the 
pension obligation constant as a fraction of GNP (at about 20%). Even 
after the Treasury’s supplement payment of $14 billion, an additional $5 
billion would have been required. Thus, even viewed against the rather 
weak standard that public debts should not be permitted to rise faster than 
the economy is expanding, federal pension obligations constitute a mate- 
rial problem. 
The magnitude of the pension debt might best be viewed in the context 
of the fact that while the national debt is ostensibly on behalf of and for 
the benefit of 230 million taxpayers, the pension fund is mainly for the 
benefit of 2.7 million current employees and 1.7 million annuitants. (The 
benefits to the taxpayer of accruing the fund-the  services of the employ- 
ees as they earned these pensions-have  already been received.) This net 
liability is increasing at the rate of roughly $10 billion per year in real 
terms. Including the inflation adjustment in the outstanding principal, 
this year’s increase is about $35 billion in nominal terms-$13  thousand 
for every current employee. 
Some observers regard the public’s pension obligations as less binding 
than the explicit national debt. There is no contractual obligation, they ar- 
gue, and the rules are subject to change at any time. Thus, this argument 
concludes, we  should be less concerned about pension obligations than 
about other federal commitments. There is clearly some force to this logic; as 
we  will discuss in the next section, there is currently before Congress a 
proposal that would substantially alter the existing system. This should 
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commitments.  Precisely because they are a less visible and less directly 
costly form of compensation, it seems unlikely that they will disappear as 
a feature of the federal employment landscape. 
14.2  The Current Reform Proposal 
The financial condition of  the Civil Service Pension System has finally 
begun to attract significant policy notice in Washington. The marked in- 
crease in attention is due in part to a spreading recognition and under- 
standing of estimates like those presented in the last section and in part to 
the more intense scrutiny given to all government retirement programs in 
connection with studies of social security reform. The Office of Personnel 
Management is currently drawing up proposals for substantial reform. 
While they have not yet been formally presented to the Congress, their 
general outline is beginning to emerge. Administration budget requests 
for the new fiscal year base estimates for receipts and disbursements of the 
retirement fund on a system of benefits considerably different from that 
currently in place. 
This section provides an analysis of the proposed new retirement system 
embodied in the president’s proposed FY 1984 budget. While this may not 
be the final form of the reform proposal eventually presented to the Con- 
gress, it does represent one seriously contemplated revision of the current 
system. It provides an intriguing counterpoint to  the existing structure. 
14.2.1  The Perceived Problem 
Why should the present system be reformed? A simple answer would be 
that it eventually will not be able to meet its obligations. As we saw in the 
last section, however, this is not an immediate problem. The current sys- 
tem can continue to meet its cash obligations until at least the turn of the 
century. Why, then, go to the trouble of reforming the system? 
Officials involved in the reform process give two answers to this ques- 
tion. First, they observe that the system must be reformed at some point 
and that now is as good a time as any to begin dealing with the fund’s long- 
term problems. Second, they observe that the system simply appears too 
costly, too generous, and too easy to abuse. It is costly in the sense that its 
normal funding cost is approximately twice that of  a typical high-quality 
private sector pension plan. It is generous in that it provides a relatively 
high level of benefits to many employees who retire at an early age-some 
can retire as early as age 55 and qualify for pensions replacing nearly 60% 
of their preretirement incomes. Over half of federal employees retire be- 
fore the age of 60; the comparable figure for the private sector is only 7%. 
The average replacement rate of pensions for preretirement  income for 
federal retirees is over 55%, considerably higher than for their private sec- 
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some, because after retiring on an already generous federal pension at a 
young age, many former federal employees will take private sector jobs 
that will qualify them for at least the minimum benefit under social security. 
Indeed, about 75%  of federal retirees receive social security benefits. This 
so-called double-dipping appears to many to be an excessively generous 
feature of the combined civil service retirement and social security systems. 
One way to characterize this perceived problem is to examine the value 
of  pension benefits received at different retirement ages. While this will 
differ for each employee, depending on when employment began, how 
long he or she will live after retirement, and so on, the general pattern will 
be similar across employees. As an illustration, we can look at the pension 
“entitlements” of a typical employee. 
Figure 14.1 shows the capitalized value of  the pension received under 
the current system by an employee who joins the system at age 25  and who 
receives “typical” longevity salary increases over his or her lifetime. Gen- 
eral schedule increases compensate for a 5%  annual rate of inflation and 
provide for a 1%  real growth in salary. The figures are presented for an 
employee who would attain a nominal salary of $25,000 at the age of 58. 
In order to make the figures for the value of pension benefits to employees 
retiring at different ages comparable, the values are shown in terms of 
their equivalent capital values at age 65. For example, an employee retir- 
ing at age 40 would receive pension benefits equal in value to a $21,000 
check received at age 65; if the employee retired at age 62, the benefits re- 
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Fig. 14.1  Equivalent capitalized value of pension benefits at age 65 
(computed for an illustrative federal employee). Taken from 
calculations. See text for assumptions. 415  The Federal Civil Service Retirement System 
ceived would be equal in value to a $290,000 check received at age 65. 
Both the government and the employee are assumed to value assets and 
obligations at 1 1/2% real rate of discount, and the employee is assumed 
to live until age 74. 
As figure 14.1 shows, there is a substantial discontinuity in the value of 
pension entitlements when the employee becomes eligible for an immedi- 
ate pension. Up to this point, the system provides for a deferred pension 
that starts at age 62. Deferred pension benefits are defined in nominal 
terms. Their present value is reduced by deferral and is also eroded by in- 
flation between the time of retirement and the start of the annuity. By con- 
trast, once the pension benefits start they are indexed to inflation, so that 
they stay constant in real terms. The twin effects of  deferral and inflation 
erosion of the deferred pension benefits keep the value of the pension enti- 
tlement small until the employee becomes elegible for full retirement and 
an immediate pension. 
The discontinuity in the entitlement system comes from the shift in the 
entitlement’s value as the employee crosses this combination of  age and 
experience boundary. As figure 14.1 shows, the value of pension entitle- 
ments for our illustrative employee accumulates slowly across his or her 
working life, reaching by age 54 an amount equivalent to about $130,000 
given on his or her sixty-fifth birthday. The next year, when the employee 
qualifies for full retirement, the value suddenly jumps to the equivalent of 
$323,000. It stays at this level for approximately three years and then be- 
gins to fall, reaching $248,000 if the employee retires at age 65. 
It is clear from figure 14.1 that federal employees have a substantial, in- 
creasing incentive to work until they reach eligibility for full retirement. 
At that point, the equivalent value of their entitlement peaks; if they con- 
tinue working, it starts to fall. This is because the period of retirement gets 
shorter, an effect which outweighs the increase in pension benefits result- 
ing from higher average salary at retirement and credits for additional ser- 
vice years. If the system is in fact too costly, it almost certainly has some- 
thing to  do with the level of entitlements attained at the ages of 55-60, and 
less to do with the entitlements thereafter. 
To see this last point more clearly, we can examine the relationship be- 
tween the age at retirement and the funding rate that would be required to 
set aside sufficient assets over the employee’s working life to cover these 
pension benefits. Figure  14.2 shows that fraction of  salary that would 
have to be set aside in order to fund the retirement obligations of the illus- 
trative employee discussed above. The required funding rate rises slowly 
across the employee’s working life; if  he or she retires before age 54, the 
funding rate is below 15%. At the age of eligibility for full retirement, 
however, the required rate jumps sharply to about 36%. If the employee 
retires later, the rate drops steadily, reaching about 19% at age 65. If the 
cost of the pension system-in  the sense of its normal cost funding rate- 416  Herman B. Leonard 
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Fig. 14.2  Funding rates required for retirement for illustrative 
employee. Taken from calculations. See text for assumptions. 
is regarded as too high, it is likely to have more to do with the problem of 
providing benefits for employees who retire in the early years after they 
become entitled to a full pension rather than with those who retire before 
age 55 or at the “normal” retirement age of 65. 
14.2.2  The Proposed Reform Package 
The reforms embodied in the president’s FY84 budget request include four 
basic revisions in the pension benefits provided by the retirement system: 
A change in the definition of  “average  salary” on which the pension is 
based. Currently, the average is based on the highest three years of earn- 
ings; the new system would base it on the highest five years. This would 
be a return to the definition used up until 1969. 
A modification of the credits for service years. Currently, the system 
gives credits totaling 16.25% for the first 10 years of service and 2% for 
each year of service thereafter; the new system would give credits of 
1.5% for every service year. This provision will only be invoked in FY89 
and after, and then only if the calculated normal cost of the system con- 
tinues to exceed 22%. 
A  reduction in the adjustment  of pension benefits for inflation for 
those who are under 62 years of age. Currently, all pension benefits are 
fully indexed. Under the new system, those under age 62 would receive 
cost of living adjustments equal to one-half of the increase in the general 
price level. 
A penalty for early retirement. Pension benefits would be reduced by 
5%  for each year of  age at retirement under 65. Thus, an employee re- 417  The Federal Civil Service Retirement System 
tiring at age 58 would have benefits reduced by 7 times 5%. This penalty 
would be phased in by age cohort over a 10-year period. Thus, an em- 
ployee who is 54 when the system is instituted would have benefits re- 
duced by 1/2% for each year he or she retires before age 65; an employee 
who is 53  would have benefits reduced by  1  To  per year, and so on. Em- 
ployees under the age of 45 would retire under a system with the full 
early retirement penalty. 
In addition to these alterations in the benefits formulas and cost-of-living 
adjustments, the proposed package would alter both employee and em- 
ployer contributions. In the first year, contributions for both employees 
and the Treasury would be raised from the current 7% of salary to 9%; in 
the following year and thereafter both would be set at 11  Yo. 
These adjustments in the benefit package are quite substantial, both in- 
dividually and in combination. Table 14.5 shows the effect of shifting the 
definition of average salary from a three-year to a five-year basis. Since 
the average salary calculation is defined in nominal terms, this effect is a 
function of the underlying rate of inflation. As table 14.5 indicates, the 
adjustment will reduce pension entitlements for all employees by roughly 
4%-9%,  depending on the rate of inflation. 
For those retiring  after more than 10 years of service, changing the 
credit for service years also represents a substantial reduction in pension 
benefits. Table  14.6 shows the current and new  annual pension entitle- 
ments as fractions of “average” salary and the resulting percentage reduc- 
tion in benefits. As table 14.6 shows, those who retire with more than 20 
years of service face reductions of roughly 20% in their pension benefits 
relative to those received under the current system. 
The benefit reductions from the proposed change in the cost-of-living 
indexing for pensioners under age 62 and the early retirement penalty af- 
fect only those who retire between the age of 55 and 65. Lowering the cost- 
Table 14.5  Reductions in Pension Entitlements from Change in  Definition of 
Average Salary 
Inflation Rate 





,957  .93  1  .906 
,916  .868  .824 
Reduction from using five-year 
instead of three-year average  4.3%  6.8%  9.1 % 
Source: Calculations based on average rates of salary increase due to seniority plus an as- 
sumed real growth of  1 %  per year in federal wages. 418  Herman B. Leonard 
Table 14.6  Reductions in Pension Entitlements from Change in the Credit for 
Years of Service 
~  ~~ 
Pension as a Percentage of 
Service Years  “Average” Salary  Reduction 
at Retirement 

































Source:  Calculations based on current and proposed pension benefit formulas. 
of-living adjustment for early retirees reduces the value of the benefits 
that will be received for the rest of the employee’s life. The net reduction 
in benefits therefore depends on  pensioner longevity, If the employee were 
to die shortly after age 62, the reduction would be a smaller percentage of 
the total value of the pension than if the reduced pension is received for a 
long period. An illustration using our illustrative employee may be help- 
ful. Table 14.7 shows the reduction in the present value of pension entitle- 
ments from adopting the proposed  change in the cost-of-living adjust- 
ment for a retiree under the age of 62. The employee is assumed to live to 
the age of  74 and to discount at a rate of 1.5% in real terms. As table 14.7 
indicates, early retirees may face an overall loss of over 10% of the present 
value of their pension entitlements even if the rate of inflation is only 5% 
per year. 
The effect of the early retirement penalty is, of course, the easiest to de- 
scribe; it simply amounts to a 5% penalty for each year of early retire- 
ment, where “early” is defined as under age 65. Once this feature is fully 
phased in, it amounts to a loss of one-half of the pension entitlements (rel- 
ative to the old system) for anyone retiring at age 55. 
Taken together, the proposed reforms amount to a considerable over- 
haul of the pension entitlements embodied in the Civil Service Retirement 
system, particularly for those who retire between the ages of 55 to 60. Ta- 
ble 14.8 shows the percentage reduction for various retirement ages from 
each of the changes separately and for the package as a whole for the illus- 
trative employee discussed above. These calculations assume a rate of in- 
flation of 5%. As table 14.8 indicates, even for the least affected group re- 
tiring at age 65, the package of reforms amounts to a reduction in benefits 
of more than one-quarter. For those who choose to retire as early as age 
55, the entitlement is reduced almost 70%. 419  The Federal Civil Service Retirement System 
Table 14.7  Percentage Reduction in Present Value of Pension Entitlements from 
One-Half Instead of Full Cost-of-Living Indexing to Age 62 
Inflation Rate 
Age at Retirement  2%  5 Vo  8  Vo 
55  5.6  13.3  20.2 
56  5.0  11.8  18.0 
57  4.3  10.2  15.7 
58  3.5  8.5  13.1 
59  2.7  6.1  10.4 
60  1.9  4.6  7.3 
61  1  .o  2.4  3.8 
62  -  -  - 
Source: Calculations based on typical longevity salary increases and assuming real salaries 
increase at 1  Vo per year in real terms. Based on an employee who will live to age 74 and who 
discounts at 1.5% in real terms. 
Table 14.8  Reductions in the Present Value of Pension Entitlements from 
Proposed Reforms for Illustrative Employee 
Percentage Reduction in Present Value of  Pension Benefits 
from Change in 
Age at 
Retirement  Definition of  Service  1  /2  Early  Entire 
“Average”  Year  COLA  Retirement  Package* 
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Source: Calculations. See text for assumptions. 
tive, not additive. 
*Individual reductions do not add to combined reduction because effects are multiplica- 
Figure 14.3 shows the effect of these reductions on the rate of funding 
(as a fraction of salary) that would be required to support the resulting 
pension benefits for our illustrative employee. The most dramatic reduc- 
tions are from the changes in the service years credits and from the early 420  Herman B. Leonard 
40%- 
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Fig. 14.3  Funding rates required for retirement benefits for illustrative 
employee, before and after benefit reductions. Taken from 
calculations. See text  for assumptions. 
retirement penalty. The combined effect of  the reductions is heavily con- 
centrated on ages 55-60, as table 14.8 indicated. Figure 14.3 shows that 
the combination of the proposed reductions results in the virtual removal 
of the anomalous discontinuity under the current system that occurs when 
the employee attains eligibility for full retirement. Reducing the anomaly 
of the old system is achieved through a series of changes that decrease the 
level of  benefits at every age, selectively targeted so that the reduction is 
greatest where the anomaly of the current system is largest. 
14.2.3 
The proposed changes would substantially reduce the costs associated 
with the federal pension system under any but the most perverse assump- 
tions about the effects of the reductions on retirement behavior. The fund- 
ing rate associated with full retirement under the proposed system is less 
than that under the current system at practically any age. Almost irrespec- 
tive of retirement behavior under the two systems, the new system will be 
less expensive than the old. 
Examination of the detailed simulation results for the proposed system 
confirms this impression. Table 14.9 presents results for the new system 
under the (rather strong) assumption that retirement and other experience 
rates in the system are invariant to the regime of benefit formulas. The 
proposed benefit cuts would reduce the unfunded liability of the system 
by about $140 billion, to about $400 billion, and would reduce the full 
funding rate from about 36% to  about 20% of salaries. Given the changes 
in the contribution rates embodied in the reform proposal, contributions 
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Table 14.9  Simulation Results for the Civil Service Retirement System with 
Proposed Benefit Reductions, October 1981 
Present value of projected benefit payments: 
Current annuitants  $256 billion 
Future annuitants  $366 billion 
Total  $622 billion 
Present value of projected future salaries: 
Present value of future contributions: 
Current employees  $776 billion 
Employees  $  84 billion 
Employer  $  66 billion 
Total contributions  ($15  1  billion) 
Current assets 
Actuarial unfunded liability 
Normal cost as percentage of salaries 
Unfunded liability per employee 




Source: Simulation. See text for assumptions. Assumes no change in disability and retire- 
ment rates from baseline case. 
would be approximately at the level of normal service costs, effectively 
putting the system on a full funding basis. By any standard, this would be 
regarded as a significant alteration in the long-term position of the fund. 
What is  perhaps surprising,  however, is that, sizable and significant as 
these proposed cuts are, the system still has an unfunded liability of about 
$400 billion. These alterations will not come close to eliminating the long- 
term net liabilities of the pension system. 
If these reductions are not sufficient to eliminate the unfunded liability 
of the system, just what do they do? One answer comes from comparing 
the current and proposed systems in terms of the overall entitlements of 
current participants. Table 14.10 shows the net pension wealth of current 
federal employees under the two systems. The effect of the benefit reduc- 
tions on the entitlements of current participants is dramatic, even if  the 
impact on the unfunded liability is not. Under today’s system, existing 
federal employees will receive benefits whose present value exceeds their 
future contributions by about $570 billion, or about $21 1 thousand per 
current employee. Under the proposed modifications to the system, this 
would be reduced to about $280 billion, or by almost $107 thousand per 
current employee. This is a reduction of over one-half in the net entitle- 
ments of current federal employees. If the federal government had been 
putting aside funds to cover its pension obligations on a full funding basis 
in bank accounts with its employees’ names on them, then the proposed 
modifications of  the system would remove half of the amounts in those 422  Herman B. Leonard 
Table 14.10  Net Pension Wealth of Current Federal Employees under Current and 
Proposed Retirement Systems (1981 Dollars) 
Current  Proposed 
System  System  Change 
Present value of  pension benefits  $625  B  $366 B  ($259 B) 
Present value of future  ($  54  B)  ($  84 B)  ($  30 B) 
to future annuitants 
contributions by current employees 
~~ 
Net pension wealth  $571 B  $282 B  ($289  B) 
Per employee pension wealth  $211 K  $105  K  ($107  K) 
Source: Simulations. See text for assumptions. 
accounts. For the advantage of a $53,000 per employee reduction in un- 
funded liability and reduced requirements for taxpayer contributions, ex- 
isting employees lose $107 each in net pension entitlements. 
What cut in annual pay would be financially comparable to these bene- 
fit reductions? The answer for any particular employee depends on his or 
her current age, the age at which he or she joined the system, current salary, 
and the age at retirement. We can, however, easily compute the average 
for new employees entering the system. Over the course of their working 
lives, employees within the current system receive pension benefits equal 
in value to 36.2% of the value of their salaries; they make a contribution 
of 7% of their salaries toward these benefits, so the current retirement sys- 
tem constitutes, on average, a 29.2% supplement to wage income. The 
proposed system has a funding rate of 19.5%, and employees would con- 
tribute 11% of this; it thus constitutes an 8.5% supplement to wage in- 
come. Stated in terms of its impact on total compensation by employees 
over the course of  their working lives, then, the proposed system repre- 
sents a reduction from 129.2% to 108.5% of current wage income. This is 
equivalent to a 16% reduction in total compensation for employees with 
the bulk of their working lives ahead of them. 
For employees who have already been in the system for a number of 
years, the annual pay cut equivalent to these pension entitlement reduc- 
tions is substantially larger. The size of the pension entitlement cut is simi- 
lar, but there are fewer working years remaining over which to amortize it. 
Consider, once again, the employee discussed above, and assume that he 
or she is currently 40 years old and has 15 years of service. In working 
from age 40 until retirement, the employee will be “paid” in two ways: the 
receipt of an annual salary, and an increase in the value of pension bene- 
fits. Column 1 of table 14.11 shows the percentage of such an employee’s 
total compensation that would be expected to come in the form of  in- 
creases in the value of pension benefit entitlements from the age of 40 up Table 14.11  Pension Reductions as an Equivalent Percentage Reduction in Total Compensation for the Remainder of the Illustrative Employee’s 
Working Life (to Nearest I) 
Age at  Pension Compensation  Pension Cut  Pension Cut  Wage Cut  Total Cut 
Retirement  Total Compensation  Pension Compensation  Total Compensation  Total Compensation  Total Compensation 



































































Col. 1:  Pension compensation as a percentage of total compensation, age 40 to retirement, current system. 
Col. 2:  Percentage reduction in pension compensation, age 40 to retirement, from proposed changes in pension entitlements. 
Col. 3:  Percentage reduction in total compensation, age 40 to retirement, from proposed reduction in pension benefits (col. 1 * col. 2). 
Cot. 4:  Percentage reduction in total compensation, age 40 to retirement, from 4% decrease in net wages due to increase in employee contribution. 
Cot. 5:  Total percentage reduction in total compensation (does not equal col. 3 + col. 4 because effects are multiplicative). 
Source: Calculations. See text for assumptions. 424  Herman B. Leonard 
to various retirement ages. Column 2 shows the percentage reduction in 
the value of these entitlements. Column 3 shows the resulting percentage 
reduction in total compensation stemming from entitlement cuts; it is the 
product of columns 1 and 2. Column 4 shows the percentage reduction in 
total compensation stemming from the increased employee contribution 
to the retirment  system. This represents a 4% cut in net wages; it is a 
smaller fraction of total compensation. Column 5 shows the combined ef- 
fect of the reduction in pension benefits and the reduction in net wages as 
a percentage of compensation that would have been received under the 
current system. This gives the impact of the pension reductions, measured 
as a pay cut. As table 14.11 indicates, the proposed reforms reduce annual 
compensation by nearly 30% for a 40-year-old employee who planned to 
retire at 55. Even if  the employee does not plan to retire for another 25 
years, the proposed pension adjustments reduce annual pay by about 10% 
over his or her remaining working life. Viewed in terms of its equivalent in 
the form of  a general salary reduction, the proposed  reform package 
clearly constitutes a sizable alteration from current policies. 
The proposed modifications close the gap that currently exists between 
the contributions to the fund and the normal service costs of  the system. 
Resources to close the gap must have come from somewhere. How much 
was involved, and where did it come from? A simple way to examine this 
issue is to compare the hypothetical “balance sheets” of the current and 
proposed systems through a “sources and uses” analysis. Table 14.12 pre- 
sents the balance sheets, and table 14.13 shows the “sources” of funds in- 
Table 14.12  Comparative Actuarial Balance Sheets, Current and Proposed 
Retirement Systems (in Billions of 1981 Dollars) 
~  ~  ~~ 
Current  Proposed 
System  System 
Assets 
Current assets 
Present value of  future contributions 
Current employees 
Employer (at full funding rate) 
73  13 
54  84 
227  61 
Total assets  354  224 
Liabilities 
Present value of  future benefits 
Current annuitants 
Current employees 
269  256 
625  366 
Total 
Fund balance (unfunded liability) 
Total liabilities and fund balance  354  224 
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Table 14.13  Sources and Uses Analysis of Proposed Pension System Modifications 
(All Figures in Present Value, Billions of  1981 Dollars) 
Sources of funds: 
Increases in future contributions by current employees 
Reductions in benefits to current annuitants 




Total sources of funds  302 
Uses of  funds: 
Reduction in future contributions by employer  I60 
Reduction in unfunded liability  142 
(at full funding rate) 
Total uses of  funds  $302 
Source: Calculations based on table 14.1  1. 
volved in the change from the current to the proposed system and the 
“uses” to which these funds have effectively been put. 
Table 14.13 indicates that all of the sources are effectively from current 
or former employees, while all of the uses of funds are to reduce obliga- 
tions or payments of taxpayers. Employees pay more and receive less. 
Taxpayers are projected to pay less and are responsible for a smaller un- 
funded liability. The proposed package of plan revisions amounts to a 
very considerable reduction of taxpayer obligations. Faced with a gap be- 
tween obligations and income, the Office of Personnel Management pro- 
posal balances the system solely by cutting taxpayer obligations. As table 
14.13 shows, this would constitute a $300 billion shift from current federal 
employees and annuitants to taxpayers. 
14.2.4  The Cash Implications of  the Proposed Reforms 
Though they would reduce the net pension wealth of current employees 
by over one-half, the proposed reforms have a relatively small effect on 
the cash outflow from the retirement system over the next few years. Ta- 
ble 14.14 shows estimates of the excess of benefit payments over employee 
contributions under the current and proposed systems for  1983-2050. 
This represents the annual cash deficiency of the fund, before employer 
contributions, interest on fund assets, and supplemental payments from 
the Treasury. It is the amount that must be made up out of some combina- 
tion of payments from the Treasury and reductions in fund assets. As ta- 
ble 14.14 indicates, the cash deficiency of the fund under the current sys- 
tem is approximately $20 billion per year (in 1981 dollars) over the next 
seven years. Under the proposed system, this would be reduced to about 
$16 billion per year, or by about 20%. Thus, the net cash outflow from the 
Treasury (including the employer contribution, interest on the fund, sup- 
plemental payments, and so on) is reduced by about $4 billion per year in 
the early years of the reform. For the years from 2000 to 2050, the annual 426  Herman B. Leonard 
Table 14.14  Estimated Annual Cash Deficiencies of  the Current and Proposed 
Retirement Systems, 1983 to 2050 (All Figures in Billions of  1981 
Dollars) 
Current  Proposed 

















































Source: Simulations. See text for assumptions. 
cash deficiency will have been reduced by $10-$15  billion per year. Thus, 
the major gains of the proposed  reforms-viewed  from the Treasury’s 
perspective on a cash basis-are  not realized for many years. 
14.2.5  Incentive Effects of the Proposed Reforms 
In addition to changing the level of  pension benefits that will be re- 
ceived by federal workers, the proposed reforms dramatically change the 
time pattern of benefit accruals. Since the annual increments in pension 
entitlements are a considerable fraction of total compensation under the 
current system, the proposed system will have a strikingly different set of 
incentives for retirement behavior. The incentives for any given worker 
depend on personal salary history, years of experience, age, and prospec- 
tive life span. For purposes of illustration, we can examine the incentives 
implicit in the current and proposed systems for the employee used in the 
examples discussed above. Table 14.15 shows the annual salary and annual 
increments to pension entitlements (both in real terms) under the current 
and proposed systems for an employee who enters the system at age 25 
and who receives the average annual longevity salary increases as well as 
general schedule increases averaging  1%  in real terms. In assessing the 
value of pension benefits, I assume that the employee uses a discount rate 
of 1.5%  in real terms and that he or she will live to age 74.  To make it com- 
parable to an annual salary figure, the annual increase in pension entitle- 
ments is measured as the change in the present value of future pension 
benefits above a 1.5%  real return on the existing entitlement. It can be in- 
terpreted as the amount that was added in a given year to the pension enti- 427  The Federal Civil Service Retirement System 
Table 14.15  Annual Salaries and Increments to Pension Entitlements (in Excess of 
Normal Return to Accrued Entitlement), Illustrative Employee (All 
Dollar Figures in  Thousands) 
~~ 
Current System  Proposed System 
Increase  Total  Increase  Total 
in Real  Annual  in Real  Annual 
Real  Pension  Compensation  Pension  Compensation 
Salary  Entitlement  Entitlement 
Age  (1)  (2)  (3 = 1 +  2)  (4)  (5 = 1 +  4) 
45  $17.1 
50  20.1 
51  20.7 
52  21.3 
53  21.8 
54  22.5 
55  23.0 
56  23.7 
57  24.4 
58  25.0 
59  25.6 
60  26.3 
61  27.0 
62  27.6 
63  28.3 
64  29.0 
65  29.6 








-  .8 
-  1.8 
-  3.0 
-4.1 
-  5.5 
-  6.9 
-  8.4 
-9.9 
-  11.6 




















































Source:  Calculations. See text for assumptions. 
tlements in addition to crediting an annual interest payment of  1.5%  in 
real terms.S 
There is a sharp contrast in retirement incentives between the current 
and proposed systems. Under the current system, annual increments in 
the pension (in excess of the normal rate of  return on what had already 
been accrued) are roughly 30%-35%  of salary in the years from age 50 to 
age 54. As the employee works from age 54 to  age 55, the pension entitle- 
ment jumps markedly, as we saw in figure 14.1; in this year the increment 
to pension wealth is over five times the salary. After age 56, however, the 
pension wealth falls with additional  years of work; the pension system ac- 
tually constitutes a negative component in total compensation after em- 
ployees become eligible for full retirement. By the time our illustrative em- 
ployee reaches age 60, the pension system is acting as a 15% cut in salary; by 
age 62 it has become a 25% cut. The net effect of this pattern of pension 
entitlement  increases together with  longevity  and general schedule in- 
creases in wages is to make total annual compensation climb steeply in 
real terms in the years before full eligibility and to make it drop dramati- 
cally when full eligibility is reached. Thus, under the current system federal 428  Herman B. Leonard 
workers have a strong incentive to continue working in the last few years 
before they become eligible for full retirement;  in the years thereafter, 
they have as strong an incentive to retire. 
In contrast, the pension entitlements in the proposed retirement system 
provide  a relatively large supplement  to salaries  for continued  work 
through age 62. As our illustrative employee works from age 52 through 
age 61, the increment to pension entitlements (in excess of the real return 
on the portion already accrued) represents the equivalent of a 20%-30% 
salary supplement. The only anomaly is at age 55, when the early retire- 
ment penalty of the new system has a particularly strong effect. Under the 
proposed system, total compensation for a year’s work rises in real terms 
relatively smoothly up to about age 62. No sudden jumps in effective an- 
nual compensation would give the employee a strong incentive to retire 
early. Moreover, the reduction in the level of pension benefits may provide 
an additional incentive to keep working; many employees may not feel 
they can afford to retire. 
As a consequence of these alterations in the retirement incentives, the 
adjustment in retirement behavior and in the age structure of federal em- 
ployment could be dramatic if  the proposed system were adopted. This 
may well be desirable, if, for example, too many highly experienced work- 
ers are retiring too early under the current system. On the other hand, its 
implications for the flexibility of the system and the opportunities for ad- 
vancement for younger workers are obvious. Since this change may have a 
material effect on the workings of the entire federal employment system, 
its implications should be carefully reviewed. 
14.3  Reforming the Funding of the Retirement System 
The Civil Service Retirement System is in need of reform. The current 
funding system is not fully coherent and is far from adequate. It repre- 
sents neither full funding of current obligations nor a conceptually sound 
means of coping with past underfunding. There is a large and growing gap 
between the assets and obligations of the fund. It can be closed only by 
putting more money in or by taking less money out. 
The reform proposal embodied in the president’s FY84  budget request 
goes a long way toward closing the existing gap through a series of benefit 
reductions. The unfunded liability would be cut by some $140 billion to 
about $400  billion, and the funding rate would fall from 36.2% to 19.5%. 
The government’s required cash payments would be reduced by about $4 
billion per year for the rest of this decade and by larger annual amounts 
thereafter. 
Reducing the government’s liabilities-which  ultimately reduces funds 
taken in one form or another from taxpayers-is  one side of the story. The 
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federal employees. The present value of their pension entitlements (net of 
the value of their future contributions) would be cut by  approximately 
one-half, or by about $105 thousand for each current federal employee. 
This is equivalent to a general schedule decrease of about 15% on average 
for employees who have joined recently; the effective reduction in annual 
compensation for some employees who have been in the system for more 
than 15 years is over 30%. 
Whether such a substantial reconfiguration of the compensation of fed- 
eral workers is wise or fair is eminently debatable. The issue cannot be set- 
tled with reference to the retirement system alone; pension benefits are 
one component of a total compensation package that includes wages and 
other fringe benefits. A full review of the level of total federal compensa- 
tion is well beyond the scope of  this paper; it should be obvious that no 
conclusions about “fairness” can be reached in the absence of  such an 
analysis. 
Some observers have argued that the level of federal pension compensa- 
tion is simply too high on gn absolute scale. Such arguments are often 
raised on the basis of comparisons with private sector pension plans. Most 
private plans provide benefits substantially less than those of federal retirees 
and have full funding rates that are correspondingly lower than that of the 
federal system. Without a similar comparison of the wage compensation 
received by federal and private workers, it is impossible to  draw any infer- 
ence from such observations. 
There is another reason to believe that such a comparison may be mis- 
leading. It is by no means obvious that private workers are appropriately 
providing for their retirement through their pension plans or through per- 
sonal saving, even allowing for their access to social security. Most private 
pensions and other personal savings plans may not provide adequately for 
increasingly long retirements. 
Consider, for example, an employee whose income rises by 2%-3% in 
real terms across a working life of 40 years. Suppose that employee will 
live for 18 years after retiring and desires a retirement income that is con- 
stant in real terms at a level of 70% of income before retirement. If the 
rate of return on assets put aside to provide this retirement income is 1.5% 
in real terms, then the employee should be saving about one-third of  in- 
come during the working years.  Because of  our increasingly long life 
spans and the low real rates of return on invested assets (particularly on 
low-risk investments, after allowing for taxes), retirement is an extremely 
expensive consumption item. 
Rather than criticizing the federal system for providing more than pri- 
vate plans, one might instead ask whether the retirement benefits those 
plans provide are adequate. It is commonly alleged that the provision of 
benefits fully indexed to inflation is bankrupting the federal pension sys- 
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fixed annuity in a world where we might live as long as 25 years in retire- 
ment and where we  have recently witnessed periods of unexpected infla- 
tion that in five years cut the purchasing power of fixed annuities in half? 
If, instead of criticizing the federal system for its relative expense, we 
focus instead on the fact that it is nearly alone in providing well for what is 
a demonstrably-and  surprisingly-expensive  part of life, then we may be 
led to diagnose a very different set of  “problems” of the federal compen- 
sation system. First, it may shift our attention to federal wages rather than 
pension benefits. If retirement is expensive and federal employees want to 
provide for it through an (appropriately) expensive pension system, then 
they should not also expect their wages to be comparable to those in the 
private sector. Private sector workers have less generous pension plans 
and are-we  hope-using  their higher current incomes to set aside personal 
assets to supplement their  inadequate pensions.  Arguably, if  the total 
compensation of federal workers is too high, it is perhaps their wages, 
rather than their pension benefits, that are out of line. 
This suggests that we may want to look beyond benefit reductions as a 
means of closing the existing gap in the retirement system. Congress may 
eventually decide that the pension system is configured about right-that 
is, that fully indexed pensions are the right form and that the current level 
of  benefits is appropriate. In that case, the gap would have to be closed 
from the other side, by finding additional funding either from the em- 
ployees-that  is, from reductions in the net wages of federal workers-or 
from taxpayers, in one form or another. 
If we believe that the pension benefit adequacy of  the federal system 
should be viewed as a strength rather than as a weakness, a second prob- 
lem that emerges is the retirement behavior of federal workers. If the level 
of benefits granted is roughly right, but the system is too expensive, then 
perhaps the average employee works for too short and retires for too long 
a period. This view is entirely consistent with the existing structure of pay 
incentives, which provide substantially lower effective annual compensa- 
tion for work after attainment of full retirement eligibility. It is also con- 
sistent with the evidence that half of  federal workers retire before age 60. 
If we take this view, then, a crucial problem of the existing system lies not 
in its level of benefits but in the fact that they are accrued too early. 
This view suggests that one approach to reforming the retirement sys- 
tem would include a combination of  benefit adjustments to reconfigure 
retirement incentives and additional funding to permit maintenance of 
pension adequacy. In this case, the following options may be in the right 
direction. 
14.3.1  Improvements in Disclosure 
The public is almost completely unaware of the magnitude of the future 
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knowledgeable commentators on federal budget issues are largely igno- 
rant of the size of the system’s quasi debt. Substantially improved disclo- 
sure-more  frequent, less arcane, more accurate, and better presented re- 
ports on system status-is  a prerequisite to serious attention.  As with 
most off-budget expenditures, a strong dose of public scrutiny might have 
a salutary effect. 
Disclosure may also help make federal decision makers aware of the 
full cost of federal employees. Current guidelines for costing employee 
time take account of “fringe benefits” but substantially underestimate the 
expense associated with the retirement system. Making this correction 
could bring decisions on labor expense and, for example, the advisability 
of substituting capital for labor in the federal government more into line 
with reality. 
14.3.2  Increasing Officially Mandated Contributions 
The fund can continue to operate on a cash basis with little or no change 
in its funding for at least another 20 years, given current estimates of sup- 
plemental Treasury payments. Continuing the practice of underfunding, 
the pension system will add to the burden future taxpayers bear for bene- 
fits presumably received by current taxpayers. Currently, roughly half of 
the system’s obligations are being funded by “debt”-increases  in the un- 
funded liability. We may wish to continue funding some of the obligations 
of  the retirement system through  debt, but if  we  choose to do so our 
choice should be deliberate and considered. To make it explicit, we could 
first make contributions to the pension system at the fully funded rate, 
and then, as a separate action, decide how much of the current funding 
should be raised from a debt issue and how much should come from cur- 
rent funds. 
Putting the system on a fully funded current basis calls for contributing 
about 36% of payroll annually, or about $14 billion more than the current 
official contribution rate provides. This year the Treasury made a supple- 
mental payment of about this amount to the fund. Rather than simulating 
interest payments on nonexistent assets, supplemental payments could be 
calculated based on the full funding rate. This would shift the basis of ac- 
counting for this transaction to a more consistent and conceptually sound 
foundation without increasing the funds transferred by the Treasury. Now 
seems to be an opportune time to change the basis of accounting for this 
transaction. 
14.3.3 
The principal and accumulated (and accumulating) interest on the exist- 
ing unfunded liability is properly a responsibility of former taxpayers. 
There is  no longer any practical way to make them responsible for it. 
How, if at all, should this accumulated “debt” be “funded”? 
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One possible approach would be to convert the unfunded liability to an 
explicit debt. Suppose, for example, that the government funded the sys- 
tem by issuing debt securities. The cash raised would be transferred to the 
retirement system, which is allowed to invest only in Treasury securities. 
Thus it would wind up taking the money and buying back the securities is- 
sued to fund it. The net transaction is simply that the Treasury printed ad- 
ditional special obligations and gave them to the retirement fund to hold 
in its portfolio. No net funds would be exchanged.6 The liability of the 
fund would now be backed by an explicit Treasury promise in the form of 
the securities held in the retirement system vault. What really backs the 
pensions is unchanged-it  is still a promise that the federal government 
will make the necessary funds available when the time comes. The obliga- 
tion would simply be a little more explicit. 
This more explicit recognition has a number of potential advantages. 
For one thing, the fund-and  the obligation-might  be taken more seri- 
ously by the public. The obligation might be easier to understand,  and 
changes in the annual performance and experience of  the fund might be 
easier to observe. These subtle changes of recognition are the stuff of 
which real scrutiny and eventual policy may be made. 
Moreover, the Treasury would owe interest on the obligations, and the 
fund would receive these payments annually. In a sense, it is exactly this 
transaction that the annual supplemental payment appropriated by  the 
Congress is simulating. Thus, the current funding arrangement is equiv- 
alent to what would obtain if the Congress ordered the Treasury to bor- 
row funds equal to the unfunded liability and put them on deposit in the 
retirement system account. The rest of the transaction-printing  these se- 
curities and handing them to the retirement system-is  merely a paper 
transaction. We  might say that the Congress, recognizing this, has merely 
decided not to carry out the paper shuffle but has carried out the real part 
of the transaction-the  actual payment of interest. 
The “simulation” approach adopted by the Congress thus misses a po- 
tentially important  opportunity to provide a more explicit and under- 
standable method for scrutinizing the fund’s status and performance. If 
the fund held the securities, it would be much easier for the public and 
commentators to understand the whole system. Making the obligation ex- 
plicit avoids the arcane notions of “unfunded liabilities” and payments of 
pseudointerest on hypothetical securities. The change would relieve the 
fund of its mysterious cloak of subtlety, which currently masks what is in 
fact a relatively simple set of transactions and relationships. 
Another possibility would be to raise the funds to cover the unfunded li- 
ability through additional taxes or through expenditure reductions. Virtu- 
ally no one would seriously propose such a drastic action. Actually raising 
the funds would explicitly back the government’s obligations but would 
be accompanied by extensive dislocations. The net impact on the economy 
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net borrowing,  taxes, or expenditures. Explicit  federal borrowing may 
displace other borrowing or may call forth more lending. If the former, 
what projects were displaced? If the latter, what would those funds now 
lent have been spent on otherwise? If the funds came from taxes or expen- 
ditures, what are the ultimate sources?  What  other spending was  not 
done? Speculation about the ultimate source of the funds will quickly be- 
come ethereal. This is perhaps the most powerful conceptual reason for 
arguing that the unfunded liability of the system should be explicitly rec- 
ognized,  and  prevented  from  growing,  but  not  necessarily  reduced 
through direct funding. Instead, the most sensible policy goal may be to 
move toward a system that (1) is fully funded on a current basis and (2) 
has explicitly recognized obligations. 
14.4  Conclusion 
The Federal Civil Service Retirement System constitutes a very large 
component of the federal government’s future promises to  pay. Its current 
size-approximately  $540 billion-is  roughly half that of the explicitly 
recognized national debt. It is also about one-half the size of the social se- 
curity quasi debt, which is a net liability on behalf of a considerably greater 
number of beneficiaries. 
The retirement system can, in all likelihood, live out this century under 
the current arrangement without running out of cash, but it cannot live 10 
years into the next century without additional funding. By any standard, 
it represents a very large obligation of which the public is at best only dimly 
aware. 
What should be done to reform its benefit structure is sure to be de- 
bated vigorously. Some will argue that the current system is far too gener- 
ous and that it amounts to considerably overpaying federal workers. Oth- 
ers will  argue that  changing  the  system  now  amounts to repudiating 
solemn promises of the government. Ultimately, the Congress will have to 
decide. 
What, if anything, might or should be done to reform its funding is also 
a complicated issue. Does it make any difference if the Congress recog- 
nizes the obligations to pensioners in the form of explicit Treasury securi- 
ties held in a retirement system vault? If so, why not fund it fully? If not, 
why fund it at all, since all of its investible funds are held in the form of 
Treasury securities? 
At the present time, it could be placed on a more solid long-term fund- 
ing basis with little change in the current net flows from the Treasury. 
Funding crises do not lead to conceptually sound reforms; there is little 
reason to  await the next crisis in the hope that it will generate fundamental 
improvement. This would seem to be an opportune time to improve the 
conceptual basis of the funding foundation on which the federal retire- 
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Appendix 14  .A 
Evaluation of Pension Fund  Obligations and 
Fin an cia1 Condition 
A number of measures of the soundness of pension systems have been ar- 
ticulated by actuaries, accountants, economists, budget analysts, and oth- 
ers. Many of the proposed  measures-like  those adopted by  the Con- 
gress-are  internally  inconsistent.  The proliferation  of  such measures 
reflects the fact that there are several dimensions to the financial condi- 
tion of a pension fund, and no one measure will appropriately summarize 
all of them. 
Accountants  argue persuasively that  the  only  appropriate basis  on 
which to evaluate the condition of any institution is the accrual basis. The 
future obligations that the organization has already contracted to meet are 
treated as liabilities, and the future contractual obligations of others to it 
are treated as assets. This perspective allows two interrelated portraits of 
the organization’s solvency. First, one can present a snapshot of the condi- 
tion at a given instant consisting of  a summary of  the existing liabilities 
and assets, and thus of the net liabilities (called the “unfunded liability”) 
of the system. Second, the annual changes in the unfunded liability can be 
examined as a measure of the performance of the fund in a particular year. 
The Unfunded  Liability 
The essence of the “unfunded liability” measure is that it represents 
only the existing accrued deficit. If the system has made more promises 
than it has collected funds to back, it has an unfunded liability. But this li- 
ability should reflect only promises already made.  This means that, in 
computing the current unfunded liability, one must presume (for the sake 
of the computation only) that future contributions to the fund will be on a 
full funding basis. If the fund has been collecting 10% of payroll when 
20% would be required for full funding, the computation of the current 
unfunded liability assumes that all future payroll contributions will be at 
the full funding rate of 20%. This counterfactual presumption is made so 
that the resulting deficit reflects only the failure to fully fund the system to 
date, not the possibility of future underfunding. 
There is a further complication in choosing the funding method under 
which the system is to be evaluated. In the view of some, current funding 
of the system should be strictly construed. For example, if a given worker 
is currently entitled to no pension because he or she has not yet worked for 
enough years to qualify, a strict construction of the fund’s existing obliga- 
tion to that worker would deny any liability. This approach is known as 
the “vested benefits” valuation method. This method recognizes only cur- 
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The fundamental principle underlying this notion is that pension obliga- 
tions are merely a part of  an employee’s compensation package; since we 
do not accrue liabilities for future salary payments, why should we  for 
pensions? 
To many, this is an unduly conservative estimation procedure. If, for 
example, half of the workers in the same age and experience category as 
the worker in question will, on a statistical basis, go on to collect pension 
benefits, it seems imprudent not to recognize that the system has accrued 
some (albeit statistical) obligation to them. This would appear to be par- 
ticularly relevant to the federal system, in which both employees and the 
employer frequently treat prospective pension benefits as “entitlements. ”’ 
The central question concerns the appropriate time pattern for this rec- 
ognition. Using a statistical view of  the cohort of  employees rather than 
the micro view of each individual employee suggests that there should be 
an annual allowance for pension obligation buildup over the worker’s 
lifetime. There are many ways in which this statistical obligation could be 
amortized across the years ofjhe employee’s career. A common approach 
is to amortize the projected expenses through a contribution stream that is 
a level fraction of the employee’s salary over his or her career. This is easy 
to understand and to administer. It leads to more funding later in the ca- 
reer than would a level payment in nominal terms, preventing any sub- 
stantial changes in the “effective rate” of the contribution as a fraction of 
income. This method is referred to as the “normal cost” approach to pen- 
sion funding. 
There is one further ambiguity within this approach. The fraction of 
salary required to fund a pension for a worker who enters the system at 
age 40  may be different from that required for a worker who enters at age 
25. Depending on the benefit structure and projected salary trajectories, 
the appropriate funding rate may be either higher or lower for the worker 
who enters later in life. Rather than recognize a different funding rate for 
each entry-age cohort of workers, most systems compute an average fund- 
ing rate appropriate for the mix of entry ages they experience. This is 
known as the “entry age normal” funding method. It is used as the basis 
for estimating the unfunded liabilities discussed in this paper. 
Changes in the Unfunded Liability 
While the unfunded liability provides a useful snapshot of the condition 
of a retirement system at a given instant, its effect is to show only the ac- 
crued excess of  obligations the system has accepted over its current and 
prospective available funds. This measure shows only status; it cannot 
show direction. We  can, however, get a measure of the current perfor- 
mance of a system by focusing on changes in the unfunded liabilities from 
year to year. The unfunded liability shows the accumulated history from 
the start of the fund to the present; the change in the unfunded liability fo- 436  Herman B. Leonard 
uses  on the current performance of the fund-whether  its funds are well 
invested, whether it continues to extend more promises than it is collecting 
funds to back, and so on. 
The Current and Prospective Cash Balance of  the Fund 
The accrual basis for evaluating a retirement  system is designed to 
match the future income and obligations of  the fund to give a coherent 
picture of its current status. It cannot, however, provide a summary of the 
current and prospective cash position of the fund, which is an equally vital 
aspect of its financial condition. Thus, in addition to  examining appropri- 
ate estimates of the unfunded liability of the fund and of the year-to-year 
changes in the unfunded debt, it is important to develop projections of the 
cash balances of the fund. This effort is complicated by the fact that it de- 
pends on the number and average salary of employees who have not yet 
entered the employment system. (The measures that concentrate on un- 
funded liabilities can be computed with reference only to current employees 
and annuitants.) Thus, an evaluation of the fund’s cash position involves 
projections of the size of the federal civil service over a considerable time 
period and must be viewed as uncertain. However, given the importance 
of the cash basis integrity of the fund-and  particularly noting Congress’s 
efforts to prevent, or at least delay, cash insolvency in the retirement sys- 
tem-we  cannot completely avoid making cash projections. 
Appendix 14. B 
Sensitivity of the Estimates 
The estimates presented here are, in a qualitative sense, relatively insensi- 
tive to the parametric assumptions of the model. Because civil service re- 
tirement benefits are indexed, the assumed rate of  inflation is practically 
immaterial. Perhaps surprisingly, the unfunded liability is also insensitive 
to changes in the assumed rate of real salary growth. Briefly, this results 
from the rough balance between two offsetting effects: while more rapid 
growth of salaries would increase future pension costs, it also increases 
future contributions (at the full funding rate used in calculating the cur- 
rent unfunded liability). Changing the assumed annual rate of real salary 
increase from 1070 (used in the estimates reported in the text) to 0% or 2% 
genmlly changes the estimated unfunded liability by only $20-$30 billion 
(depending on the other assumptions made), or by about 4%-5%. 
The one major assumption that does have a considerable impact on the 
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Because the bulk of both revenues and benefit payments lies well in the fu- 
ture, the rate at which they are discounted has a notable effect. Moreover, 
since we know that benefit payments exceed anticipated contributions but 
on average occur later, it is clear that the unfunded liability will be lower 
the higher is the assumed rate of discount. Table 14.A.1 shows the esti- 
mated unfunded liability under the baseline assumptions for other param- 
eters and a range of discount rates. It is clear that any tenable assumption 
about the long-term real discount rate results in a very large unfunded li- 
ability. Even if we discount at 3% in real terms-whch  seems very gener- 
ous-the  unfunded liability remains over $400 billion. Perhaps the most 
optimistic way to read the results in table 14.A.1 is to note that even if we 
should be using a lower rate of discount-1  Yo  instead of 1.5% for exam- 
ple-the  unfunded liability remains below $600 billion. 
What rate of discount should we use? The discount rate should be the 
long-term risk-free rate of return in the economy. A number of  research- 
ers (see, e.g., Carlson 1977; Garbade and Wachtel 1978; Bodie 1980) have 
presented evidence that one proxy for this rate, the real rate of return on 
short-term Treasury debt, ranged from approximately zero to about 3% 
over the period 1950-75, with most values between 1% and 2%. Since the 
Federal Reserve Bank changed its monetary management policies in Octo- 
ber of 1979, real returns have been considerably higher, at times as high as 
6%-8%. On the theory that financial effects are likely to be more volatile 
than real effects, and that the real discount rate should ultimately reflect 
the real rate of sustainable long-term economic growth, a moderate rate 
of 1.5% has been used here. To some this will seem very high when com- 
pared to the long-term rates of return achieved in the last 30 years. To oth- 
ers it will seem too low as an estimate of  what well-managed economic 
growth might produce. We can take some solace in the fact that the com- 
parisons among alternative policies-the  main focus of  this paper-are 
likely to be little affected by changes in the discount rate. 
Table 14.A.1  Sensitivity of Unfunded Liability Estimates to Changes in  the 
Assumed Discount Rate 
Assumed Discount Rate (070)  Unfunded Liability ($ Billion) 
.8 











Source:  Simulation. Parameters are as in baseline case except for discount rate. 438  Herman B. Leonard 
Notes 
1.  It is not completely immaterial in the Civil Service Retirement System because of  an 
anomaly in the calculation of  benefits. Since the salary history used to compute the retire- 
ment benefit is an average of three years’ salary-expressed  in nominal terms-the  nominal 
rate of salary increases has a slight impact on  the relation between the salaries paid and the 
retirement benefits, when both are converted into real terms. In addition, some reform pro- 
posals cut the rate of increase in pension benefits after retirement to something less than the 
full cost of  living increase. If such a system were adopted, the real value of  benefits received 
would depend on  the rate of inflation. In every other respect, holding all real rates constant, 
changing the assumed rate of inflation has no  impact. 
2.  Taking this view raises an interesting point of controversy. I assume that assets in the 
fund are worth their current market value. In fact, however, they may be worth less than 
this, because there appears to be a consistent fund policy of investing them in below-market 
rate of return “special” federal securities. 
3.  The appendix discusses the determination of “normal cost” and other technical as- 
pects of the valuation of pension fund assets and liabilities. 
4.  This rate was used throughout the analyses presented here; comparisons of different 
scenarios should be little affected by this choice. The basis for this choice, and the sensitivity 
of the resulting estimates of the unfunded liability, is discussed in appendix 14.B. 
5. This effectively assumes that a 1.5%  real return to the entitlements already accrued 
should not be viewed as a part of annual compensation because it is not a return received for 
working. Rather, it is an interest payment on  amounts credited for earlier work. 
6.  Because no  funds actually need to be borrowed from private lenders, this transaction 
should have no  direct impact on  securities markets. 
7.  The Office of Management and Budget classifies the Civil Service Retirement System 
as an “entitlement” program. It does not, however, classify the wages of federal employees 
as an  entitlement. This is a puzzling distinction, since both are part of compensation for fed- 
eral employment. 
Comment  Paul A. Samuelson 
Herman Leonard has done a good job in reckoning numerically the intri- 
cate actuarial costs that are involved in the federal government’s pension 
arrangements. The final number is large, surprisingly large even to those 
who had a vague presentiment concerning the size of the unfunded liability. 
There are various levels at which the economic analysis of unfunded 
pension liabilities can be pitched. There is the narrow private view.  I am 
about to take over a company such as Western Union: what is the cash value 
of the pension liabilities I am taking on? Leonard has stuck to this aspect 
of the question. 
There is also a broader economic view. Pensions are an important part 
of life-cycle saving, and how they are handled raises all the questions that 
go into an overlapping  generations  macro  model.  Thus,  suppose our 
mixed economy became a thoroughgoing socialism. Then we should all be 
government employees. It is a problem for intricate economic analysis to 
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investigate what differences it might make if all employers did fully fund 
their pension liabilities or if, in the manner of Leonard’s federal govern- 
ment, all employers left much of the liability unfunded. Less intricate are 
the issues that would be raised if employers generally introduced age and 
years-of-service profiles in their pension options that were as eccentric as 
those of the federal government. 
First, stick to the narrow view. Leonard estimates the federal unfunded 
pension liability at almost $600 billion (in 1982 dollars), which is fully half 
of the well-publicized total public debt. That does not include the pension 
liabilities of the armed services: when Leonard proceeds to make the simi- 
lar calculation for it, he expects to come out with a number that also ex- 
ceeds half the conventional public debt. So, many people who think that 
the public debt for which there will have to be taxes in the future is only 
about four months of  current GNP ought to more than double that num- 
ber. When the pension liabilities of the Post Office are added in, and the 
open-ended commitment of the government to give medical care gratis to 
veterans who reach a certain age, we might be talking about a debt obliga- 
tion of almost a year of GNP. 
Robert Hall and Robert Barro have formulated models of life-cycle and 
bequest spending in which any future tax collections to handle the public 
debt are already factored into people’s current spending and saving be- 
havior. The plausibility of this polar case and the support it receives from 
fragmentary empirical evidence I do not find to be impressive. But to the 
extent that it is valid, and to the extent that Leonard has brought new in- 
formation to us people who are supposed to be acting in the Hall-Barro 
way, one would have to expect that these revelations would cause us to be 
spending less than would otherwise be the case, as we try to perform pri- 
vate thrift to offset our public thriftlessness. (I offer myself as a guinea 
pig, as one more likely than most to keep bequest motives in mind and to 
keep an eye on future tax loads. What I want for my immediate progeny is 
a place a little more favorable in the relative income distribution; so long 
as I know that Leonard’s burden will be on all my heirs’ neighbors as well 
as on them, I won’t cut out my planned trip to Europe because of Leonard’s 
news.) 
Idiosyncratic Retirement Options 
How this all came about is no mystery. Congress legislated it, and did so 
in a fairly unconscious manner-the  more so because many of the costs 
did not have to be faced up to in the immediate future. Civil servants with 
30 years’ service were given the right to retire with full benefits at  55; those 
with 20 years of service could retire at 60;  those with 5 years of service at 
62. And the scale of benefits was to be set by the highest three years of 
earnings, as applied to a convex function that depends on the number of 
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As Leonard’s charts show, this is indeed an idiosyncratic schedule of 
lifetime payments. Many people are practically bribed to retire at early 
ages; staying on will earn them little or even cost them money. 
Some people see Pareto optimality everywhere. To them it may be ra- 
tional for the government to have a need for the kinds of employees who 
treasure job security and who are anxious to retire earlier than the median 
person. There may even be a gain in efficiency if people who have grown 
stale on the job are encouraged to make way for fresher people; and as the 
retired civil servants find new careers in the private sector their torpid fac- 
ulties are encouraged to come to  life again. Even in the absence of induced 
changes in  efficiency, an employer  (like the  federal  government)  that 
trades off high wages now for higher retirement benefits can expect to at- 
tract the subset of the labor force that has least Bohm-Bawerkian time 
preference. 
I go along with this analysis in some measure. But the sharp corners and 
kinks that got put into the federal system suggest to me not conscious ad- 
aptation  and  selection but  rather  absent-mindedness  and inefficiency. 
There is a presumption in favor of legislative reforms. 
On the other hand, the proposed reforms that Leonard carefully de- 
scribes are extreme to the point of being draconian. As he indicates, a siz- 
able capital levy is to be imposed without much public discussion or de- 
bate on various  subgenerations  of  federal  employees, many of  whom 
entered the system in good faith and not a few of whom did so only be- 
cause of the bait of retirement options better than those in private indus- 
try. Perhaps the greatest surprise in Leonard’s calculations is the demon- 
stration that even the proposed draconian reforms will reduce his liability 
of $540 billion (1982 dollars) only to $400 billion. One supposes that this 
limited change must be due to the gradual easing in of the new system; and 
if  that is a correct supposition, we probably have to temper our designa- 
tion of the reforms as draconian. 
Broad Issues of Public Thriftiness 
The numbers we have been talking about are seen to be large enough to 
be comparable with the numbers representing official deficits. At least un- 
til recently macromodels typically assumed that the size and composition 
of fiscal spending and taxing had effects on the total of  production, em- 
ployment, and unemployment. To the degree this is so, we cannot simply 
assume that if  the federal government had been more provident in meet- 
ing currently its accruing pension liabilities, economic history would have 
been pretty much the same as it actually turned out to be. 
Consider the 1930s. On a simple Keynesian view, real income was stuck 
in a low-employment equilibrium. (With short-term interest rates virtually 
zero, open-market purchases would simply substitute idle money for low- 
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sions, it might be deemed simply unfeasible to get the Federal Reserve to 
expand the money supply in a way that would get rid of idle economic re- 
sources.) Now,  suppose Congress then hired many civil servants and let 
the pension liability on their account go unfunded. The effects of this het- 
erodox decision would be to raise American GNP, raise employment, lower 
unemployment, raise current consumption and profits, and perhaps even 
induce more private capital formation than would otherwise have taken 
place. All these effects are in comparison with raising taxes contempora- 
neously to fund the future pension liabilities. For, on the simple Keynesian 
view of depression economics, such tax collections would depress dispos- 
able incomes and thereby depress consumption spending (there being no 
realistic Hall-Barro offset). With short interest rates already at rock bot- 
tom and long rates hard to nudge faster downward, and with the marginal 
efficiency schedule of investment perhaps inelastic, it would be unrealistic 
to think that corresponding to the government’s increment of pension as- 
sets there has been any appreciable deepening of capital. 
You  will recognize that in terms of such a depression mode, it was in- 
deed the case that the naval battleships built during the early 1930s cost the 
economy nothing-indeed,  they involved a negative real cost. Similarly, in 
such a model it would have been a mistake to try to  fund social security on 
an actuarial basis. If pay-as-you-go social security lowered the schedule of 
effective thriftiness  for the nation, then that would end up raising the 
amount of real capital that later generations are endowed with, in accor- 
dance with the paradox of thrift. 
I don’t have to remind you that things are quite otherwise in a model 
based on rational expectations. If all markets clear, the Great Depression 
never happened. If it didn’t happen, then a reduction in public thriftiness 
that is not recognized and offset by an increase in private thriftiness will 
result in a higher consumption mix of the perpetual full-employment equi- 
librium. So, even if it is efficient to have government workers labor for so 
brief a period in their life, and consume so much in retirement at the ex- 
pense of  what they consume in their working years, the failure to fully 
fund federal pensions will have created no increment of productive capital 
that can be tapped when the load of federal pensioners rises relative to  the 
working population. 
The real world, I have to believe, is somewhere in between that of the 
depression economics model and the rational expectations  version-perhaps 
these days nearer to the latter than the former. Particularly in the age of 
Reaganomics, which suffers from a bad dose of Laffer-Kemp supply side 
economics, America is an undertaxed nation. I am not referring to the re- 
cession deficit but rather to the structural deficit that looms ahead at high 
employment levels. I must confess that it was my expectation that conser- 
vative Republicans would long since have tried to sell the country broad- 
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able to force down civilian federal expenditures. Leonard’s calculations 
show us that things are even worse in this regard than one had thought. 
Let me conclude with some reflections that make it plausible that popu- 
list democracy will tend to go down the primrose path of unfunded em- 
ployee pensions and inadequately funded social security programs. This is 
almost a theorem in demographic mathematics. 
1. At the beginning of a new system it needs little cash because retire- 
ments are few relative to contributors. The temptation is to vote generous 
benefits for the few and to vote much less than steady-state actuarial rates 
on the many. 
2.  If  the Ponzi game grows at a fast enough exponential rate, the 
primrose path can look good forever. The unfunded liability goes toward 
infinity but the revenues collected currently at below-actuarial rates are 
enough to finance the benefits of the pensioners (whose numbers stay at 
an abnormally low ratio to  workers). 
3. When population growth slows down, so that we no longer have 
the comfortable Ponzi rate of growth or we even begin to register a decline 
in total numbers, then the thorns along the primrose path reveal them- 
selves with a vengeance. 
As Leonard shows, what has come to pass in the field of social security 
has also begun to come to  pass in the field of federal pension provision. 
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